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Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya's Military Campaign in Somalia

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Abstract

From time to time, states resort to armed engagements with others for various reasons. War is mostly considered the last resort in the pursuit of the national interests of states. Throughout the modern nation-state system and more so since the end of the Second World War, states have been slow to resort to war. More often than not they may opt to interact with their potential adversaries through peaceful means before to armed campaigns. Such adversaries may take the form of state or non-state actors, which may include sub-national groups, belligerent movements or any other formation(s) perceived to be a threat to state survival. It was under such circumstances that Kenya sent its troops to Somalia in pursuit of the Al Qaeda-linked terror organization, Al Shabaab in mid-October 2011.

In practical terms, Kenya did not declare war on Somalia but rather she invoked her right to self-defence against a threat emanating from her important neighbour, Somalia.

Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Kenya proclaimed self-defence as an inherent right and declared that she had to do whatever was necessary to keep her borders secure from terrorism and economic sabotage. These events attracted immense academic and policy debates given that this was Kenya's first major military offensive in the region since the Shifta War in 1965. Many questions were posed as to the legality of the offensive dubbed Operation Linda Nchi. While Kenya was not at war with her important neighbour Somalia, her troops were inside Somalia pursuing Al Shabaab on the ground, from the air and at sea. In the first instance, Kenya acted unilaterally but a few weeks later, the armed campaign became a venture involving Somalia's Transitional Federal Government forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops. It is noteworthy that even as such military campaigns take place, the role of diplomacy never ceases. Diplomacy is a major asset of statecraft. As such the question is, what is the role of diplomacy in Kenya's military campaign in Somalia? In this direction, this paper explores the diplomatic challenges that Kenya faced before and continues to face in its armed engagement with the Al Shabaab, not only in the regional but the global context as well.

Introduction

The state's security is the first imperative of foreign policy. Diplomacy is what gives concrete expression to this imperative. Working diplomats and statesmen can ignore this only at great peril. The management of relationships with neighbours especially those that are a security threat or concern becomes the highest diplomatic priority. While war is the ultimate argument of the state, in wartime however, diplomatic strategy supports military strategy through the management of relations with allies and the disruption of enemy alliances. It strives to translate battlefield victories into post-war gains. Diplomacy therefore struggles to minimize the consequences of military setbacks or defeat while mapping out the modalities for a stable and sustainable post-war situation. These must be the issues that run through the minds of diplomats and top security operatives with the on-set of Kenya's military campaign in Somalia in October 2011. Kenya sent its troops to Somalia in pursuit of the Al Qaeda-linked terror organization, Al Shabaab that she accused of planning and executing international terrorism in Kenya and the entire Eastern Africa region, thereby threatening state and human security in the region.

In practical terms, Kenya did not declare war on Somalia but rather she invoked her right to self-defence against a threat emanating from her close and important neighbour, Somalia. Invoking Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Kenya proclaimed self-defence as an inherent right and declared that she had to do whatever was necessary to keep her borders secure from terrorism and economic sabotage. These events attracted immense academic and policy debates given that this was Kenya's first major military offensive in the region since the Shifta War of the 1960s. Many questions were posed as to the legality of the offensive dubbed Operation Linda Nchi.

While Kenya was not at war with her important neighbour Somalia, her troops were inside Somalia pursuing the Al Shabaab on the ground, from the air and at sea. In the early days of the campaign, Kenya acted unilaterally in most of southern Somalia. However, by June 2012, the armed campaign transformed into a joint operation involving Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops.

This paper addresses the diplomatic challenges that Kenya faced before and during the war in Somalia with specific reference to the period before the formal re-hat of the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into AMISOM.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

War, defined as "direct, systematic violence between state actors" is considered by realists to be intrinsic to the international system, and this is the idea behind the "distinctive hallmark of realism," in other words the political element of warfare (Evans and Newman, 1998). The idea that war is an instrument of state policy was most famously summarized by the Prussian theorist of war Karl Von Clausewitz who argued that: "war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means" (Clausewitz, 1832). The concept of state security is tied to the general scenario described above, especially with respect to the condition of anarchy and its negative consequences. The sovereign state becomes the ultimate guarantor of people's security. Wrapped in the protective mantle of sovereignty people can find a measure of security that is simply unattainable under other conditions. Thus the state is the primary source of protection for individuals and sub-state groups. This leads directly to the notion that it is the duty of the state to provide this protection, not only from external threats but also from within as well. But what role does diplomacy play during war? Diplomacy eases and/or

lubricates the way for the state while at war. Depending on a state's capabilities, it may need to negotiate with stronger ones in order to meet its policy ends. Similarly, the application of pressure and coercion is a form of diplomacy usually practiced by powerful nations against weaker ones. For greater effectiveness, this is often supplemented with incentives and rewards, which is sometimes called "policy of positive engagement" (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000). Creating a sound frame of regional cooperation on any matter is a key concern of diplomacy. No less important is cross-regional cooperation, especially linking up sets of neighbouring countries that straddle different regions. This usually hinges on sound bilateral relationships between key countries, since bilaterally it is the basic building block of diplomacy. Wider concepts of security concerns suggest the need for alternative and agile diplomacy that looks to building issue-specific coalitions with like-minded nations, putting aside all notions of ideology and division. It also underscores the value of sound relationships with all the major power centres of the globe, even if one does not subscribe to the concepts of multi-polarity (Rana, 2002:58).

Against this background, and even though Kenya is arguably a leading economic and military power in the entire Eastern Africa, other states in the region and especially Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti have a stake in the Somalia conflict. Equally, Uganda is also a key party being the leading contributor of troops to AMISOM. Indeed, Kenya required the support and goodwill of not only Somalia's TFG government but also that of its neighbours. Similarly, the stand of international hegemonies such as the United States, the European Union and China would make or break Kenya's war effort. In the same vein, the take of IGAD on the matter is equally important. As such the role of diplomatic manoeuvre as far as Kenya's military campaign in Somalia is concerned is worth investigating and analyzing.

From a liberal viewpoint, the end of the Cold War presented a wealth of new opportunities for international co-operation, mainly requiring the exercise of political will among key players to bring about an unprecedented level of international peace and security. Thus, the liberal viewpoint subscribes to the possibility of a managed anarchy. Whether designed specifically with economic integration or security issues in mind, the existence of key players, and other such organizations, is seen as constituting an international institutional network; the net effect of which is to enhance the prospects for building a durable regime of international peace and security in the twenty-first century. In this case, the role of diplomatic manoeuvre both at the bilateral and multilateral levels is central to this discussion. This paper relied on secondary sources of data; however, this was complemented by insights from interactions and interviewing with various key actors in the various government agencies involved in Kenya's military campaign in Somalia. Such actors included staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving and retired military personnel as well as media personalities and fellow scholars engaged in this specific subject matter.

Background to Kenya's Military Campaign in Somalia

Following the formation of the TFG in Nairobi in late 2004, President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and his allies, were under pressure from Kenya and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states to relocate to Somalia and set up a provisional capital in Jowhar on the grounds that Mogadishu was insecure. Two assassination attempts on Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi while visiting the old capital city did at least confirm the TFG's fears. Nonetheless, key figures in Yusuf's government led by Hassan Adan (the speaker of Parliament) preferred to operate from the capital Mogadishu. They finally settled on Baidoa, a neutral town 250 kilometres northwest of Mogadishu. All this while, Mogadishu and its environs were in the hands of warlords who had established strongholds around the ruined city following more than a decade of anarchy. Meanwhile, another force sprung to power, the The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in June

2006. The ICU captured Mogadishu from the warlords who had already formed an alliance, Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT).

The rise of the ICU marked the emergence of militant Islamism as a major ideology that cut across traditional social divisions and challenged traditional modes of dispute resolution by ascending to some degree above the clan structure. The Islamic Courts began a decade ago as a local clan-based mechanism for dealing with chronic lawlessness in Mogadishu (Crisis Group Africa Report No. 116, 2006:16-17). The locals and the business community embraced the Islamic Courts as they provided a semblance of governance in the south and brought some degree of peace and security hitherto unknown to the troubled country. For a long time under its reign, Mogadishu was reunited, militia checkpoints were torn down, weapons were removed from the streets and the international port and airport reopened for business. By December 2006, the courts had expanded from their Mogadishu base to control most of southern Somalia, before they were roused-out by Ethiopian and TFG forces.

The TFG was faced by opposition from two fronts: an associated group of militia led by warlords on one hand and several groups of Muslim leaders who held Islamist and/or anti-western views as far as the future of the country was concerned. During 2009 and early 2010 suicide bombings, particularly by the Al-Shabaab, were rife in and around Mogadishu; Somalia's war-battered capital. Indeed, since June 2009, five Somali ministers have been killed by Al Shabaab suicide bombers.

These attacks have demonstrated that the Al Shabaab is a formidable destabilizing factor to the government in Mogadishu.

Washington has maintained that Al-Shabaab is Al Qaeda's proxy in Somalia, and especially after the then leader of the ICU, Sheikh Dahir Haweys advocated and called for attacks on foreigners until they left Somalia. For a while, it seemed like the activities of the Al-Shabaab were confined to Somalia in its quest to oust the Government of Sheikh Sharrif Ahmed by whatever means possible. However, being a terror group, it should not have come as a surprise when Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the Kampala attacks of 11 July 2010. On 23 July 2010, the eve of African Union's Summit in Kampala, the AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping, announced they had asked countries, to contribute troops to AMISOM, then comprising only Ugandan and Burundian forces. The AU decision to reinforce AMISOM by almost 2,000 troops would increase the size of the force from its current level of around 6,300 (4 Ugandan and 3 Burundian battalions), to the 8,000 mandated in 2007. Some AU member states had even called for the force to be augmented to between 14,000 and 20, 000 troops. Although the African Heads of State strongly condemned the Kampala terror attacks, they seemed unable to provide a final and lasting solution to the 'Somalia Question' (Menkhaus, 2012).

Since attaining independence in 1963, Kenya has enjoyed relative tranquillity, peace and security with her neighbours and the global community. The first terror attack that took place at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on 30 December 1980 was seen as a one-time event and no serious measures were put in place to address similar potential threats. However, this began to change after the 7 August 1998 Al Qaeda bomb terror attack targeting the US Embassy in Nairobi. The attack resulted in the loss of over 252 innocent lives with over 5,000 people injured. Majority of the victims were Kenyans.

Although Kenya was not the direct target of these attack, the extent of that attack had great implications on the discourse of national security in Kenya (Nzau, 2010).

Barely four years later, a second major terror attack took place on Kenyan soil. On 28 November 2002, terrorists bombed Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kilifi. Twelve (12) Kenyans and three Israeli Nationals were killed in the attack. A large portion of the hotel was destroyed. The attack also involved a failed attempt to down an Israel airliner. Since then, international terrorism became a major security concern to Kenyans.

Although the terrorist attacks were not specifically targeted at Kenya, they had devastating impacts on the country particularly in the economic, political and social spheres. Principal economic sectors such as tourism were paralyzed as a result of travel bans imposed by different countries owing to the threat posed by terrorism. Despite the absence of a significant terrorist attack in the Greater Horn region since the Kikambala Bombing, terrorist groups remained active in the region with Somalia as the epicentre of anarchy. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed in Nairobi, Kenya (following the IGAD-driven Somalia National Reconciliation Conference) in October 2004, was not able to establish its authority over the war torn country.

Frequent albeit low-key terrorist attacks in Kenya, including the abduction of government and Aid workers from North Eastern Kenya, resulted in the deployment of the KDF into Somalia in mid-October 2011 to stop the Al Shabaab. Kenya declared war on the terrorist organization and stated that its security forces would henceforth pursue the aggressors across the border into Somalia (Global Post 2010). The government argued that Kenya had a right to self-defence, adding that its Constitution and the UN Charter were clear on the defence of borders. They invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which pronounces self-defence as an inherent right, which meant that the country could do whatever was necessary to keep its borders secure (Daily Nation, October 18, 2011).

Since the entry of the KDF into Somalia, the Al Shabaab has retaliated by making terror incursions into Kenya. Its spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, has been quoted threatening to launch terror attacks on Kenyan cities if Kenya does not withdraw its troops from Somalia. Indeed, since the onset of Operation Linda Nchi in 16th October 2011, Nairobi and various parts of the North Eastern and Coast regions have come under terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab operatives and their local sympathizers. The then Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga, reiterated that “Kenya was fighting terrorists and not a community,” adding that Kenya had the reason, the will and capacity to fight the militia and that the terror group leaders should be investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed in Somalia, Kenya and the Horn of Africa in general (The Nairobi Law Monthly, December, 2011). The Al Shabaab remains the greatest threat to Kenya’s national security.

Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya’s Military Campaign in Somalia

In this section, the authors delve into a discussion on how diplomatic manoeuvre was applied in order to facilitate and “ease the way” for Kenya’s strategic interests during Operation Linda Nchi (OLN). First it is true in many ways that there were plans and activities in Kenya’s military and diplomatic circles to undertake a military operation in Somalia long before the abduction of a prominent French tourist in Kenya’s north coast as well as aid workers from the Dadaab refugee Camp in Northern Kenya.

Kenya had been under growing pressure to take action and attempt to restore confidence that it was capable of not only protecting tourists but also the aid community operating in the country. Since the commencement of “Operation Linda Nchi” the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in conjunction with other stakeholders undertook to galvanize international support for the security operation and to consolidate the achievements made thus far.

On 18 October, 2011, a high powered delegation led by the Minister for Foreign Affairs met with H.E. Sheikh Shariff, President of the TFG on the security developments in Somalia. It was a clear case of diplomatic manoeuvre in which the Kenyan delegation attended a joint press conference in Mogadishu where the two sides discussed closer co-operation on security matters aimed at wiping out the Al Shabaab and thereby fortify Somalia-Kenya confidence at that critical early stage of OLN. The parties signed a joint communiqué that

undertook among others, to cooperate in undertaking security military operation and coordinated pre-emptive action; and to reaffirm their commitment to continue to work together in urging the international community to favourably consider the recommendations and decisions of the IGAD and AU in relation to strengthening the Peace Support Operation in Somalia, See (Republic of Kenya. 2011).

On 19 October, 2011, the Kenyan delegation held consultations in Addis Ababa with Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of IGAD, and with Dr. Jean Ping, Chairperson of the African Union Commission. The delegation briefed both leaders on the visit to Mogadishu and the security situation in Somalia. It was affirmed that better results could be achieved if regional partners, including IGAD and the AU, bolstered the efforts by Kenya and worked together to deal with the Al Shabaab problem.

The 41st Extra-Ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers held on 21 October, 2011 in Addis Ababa, welcomed the agreement signed between the Government of Kenya and the TFG of Somalia on 18 October, 2011 on cooperation in all aspects of the on-going security operations and further endorsed the up-scaling of security operations by Kenya in response to the threats. The Council further called for the enhancement of the capacity of AMISOM, and urged the international community to redistribute the burden of hosting the refugees to ease the staggering refugee burden on Kenya.

Further, the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the TFG held high-level bilateral talks in Nairobi on 31 October 2011. The Prime Minister of the TFG, H.E. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali led the TFG delegation, while the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kenya, Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga led the Kenyan delegation. The bilateral diplomatic discourse was a follow up to the deliberations agreed upon between the two countries in Mogadishu on 18 October 2011 on the operationalization of a Joint Mechanism to manage the joint security operations in Southern Somalia.

The meeting agreed that the Government of Kenya should not negotiate with the Al Shabaab but the TFG was free to negotiate with all armed opposition groups within the instruments provided in various IGAD and AU roadmaps for example, the Djibouti Peace Process and the Kampala Accord as recommended by IGAD and the African Union, on condition that the militants renounced violence. The meeting also discussed the positive outcome of the 41st Extra-Ordinary IGAD Council of Ministers Session held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 21 October 2011 on the security developments in Somalia. The meeting strongly affirmed the decision to jointly engage the Kenyan Defence Forces and TFG forces in war against the Al Shabaab.

On 1st November, 2011, the two Premiers briefed the Diplomatic Corp and International Organizations in Kenya on the situation in Somalia and the two countries' strategy to restore stability in Somalia. The Premiers reiterated that the main objective of the military operation in Somali is to incapacitate the Al Shabaab, stabilize the country in order to create safe humanitarian corridors within Somalia and to stem the influx of refugees into the neighbouring countries, especially Kenya.

The meeting noted that the KDF in collaboration with the TFG forces had liberated Jubaland and therefore called on the international community to channel its humanitarian support in form of food, medication, shelter and education to these liberated areas. The meeting further reiterated on the need for international support to secure Kismayu; a port town in southern Somalia considered to be the main stronghold and economic lifeline of Al Shabaab.

On 10-11 November, 2011 Kenya's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moses M. Wetangula, accompanied by the Minister of State for Defence, Mohamed Yusuf Haji, led a Kenyan delegation to Uganda and Burundi to deliver special messages from President Mwai Kibaki on the on-going Kenya security operation inside Somalia in their capacities as Troop Contributing Countries (TCC). Meanwhile, Uganda was requested to consider deploying more troops to AMISOM in Southern Somalia. Burundi had expressed its readiness to deploy more troops to Southern Somalia with authorization from IGAD and the AU. On 25 November, 2011, an Extra-Ordinary Session of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia discussed the political and security situation in Somalia. The session directed the Secretariat to ensure continuous consultations of the IGAD Chiefs of Defence staff and military experts on how to support and coordinate the operations. They further called on Ethiopia to support the Kenya-TFG and AMISOM operations.

From the on-set, Kenya was faced with the challenge of convincing not only Somalia and IGAD member states but other world states on the rationale behind OLN. The country's war against the Al Shabaab militia got a boost after several countries promised to support Kenya and Somalia. During the bilateral talks between Kenya and Somalia on 31 October 2011; representatives of the European Union, US, Canada, Turkey, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Gulf Corporation and representatives from IGAD were among those who met Kenya's Prime Minister Raila Odinga and his Somali counterpart Abdiweli Mohamed Ali and expressed their support for the military operation.

Though the donors did not specify the kind of support they were to offer Kenya and Somalia, it was a clear sign that the international community had been struggling to find a solution to the Somalia crisis and the engagement of Kenya was seen as an opportunity to build upon in an effort to end 20 years of civil war in Somalia. At that meeting, Kenya and Somalia appealed for technical, intelligence, humanitarian and logistical support for their campaign against the Al Shabaab. Similarly, under the advice of his Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers, President Kibaki travelled to the United Arab Emirates and secured support for OLN and humanitarian support for the Somali people within the liberated areas (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Meanwhile, the presence of heavily armed Kenyan troops working together with TFG forces in the entire southern part of Somalia and border areas in parts of northern Kenya heightened tensions among local civilian populations. The diplomatic front on the part of Kenya hence had the task of addressing these regional and international tensions and/or uncertainties in order to pave way and ensure internal and international confidence in the Somalia campaign. Similarly, within Kenya, the legality of OLN was also questioned with the authorities being accused of blindly getting into a war, without considering the legal, economic and national security repercussions.

Given that Kenya's military budget has dropped from 841 million dollars (2.9 % of GDP) in 1988 to 594 million dollars (2% of GDP) by 2010 (www.sipri.org); a sustained campaign in Somalia would require more resources. As such, increased military outlays were expected in order to replenish worn out equipment, acquire modern weaponry and recruit more troops and increased pay for personnel.

Other local critics of the Kenyan involvement in Somalia accused the ruling elite of using the operation as a conduit for grand corruption in which the procurement and purchase of military hardware would be used to enrich a few and raise money to finance the 2012 General Elections. Yet other critics argued that OLN was a calculated move by the ruling elite in the Coalition Government to delay Kenya's General Elections and thus remain in government as no elections can be held when a country is at war. While these accusations and counteraccusations were going around, Al Shabaab linked terror attacks in the country increased in number

and in intensity. By 2 June 2012, when OLN formally ended, at least 44 Kenyans had fallen victim to various terror attacks by the Al Shabaab.

To counter the local negative sentiments towards OLN, diplomatic manoeuvre was most at play through weekly media briefings involving the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kenya Police. The Impact of the Weekly Media Briefings was immense. The role of diplomatic manoeuvre here was to galvanize the nation to support its war mission. The civilian acceptance and pride in their national defence forces was crucial and the weekly media briefings enabled OLN to enjoy national and international support and political goodwill not least that of the Somali people. In order to sustain the justification of its unilateral move to enter Somalia, Kenya had to wedge an effective public relations campaign to isolate the Al-Shabaab from the larger Somali community, limit collateral damage to Somali civilians and take full responsibility whenever such events occur; while adhering to international laws governing the conduct of war. Towards this end, the Kenyan civilian leadership and defence chiefs displayed a commendable unity of purpose.

Diplomatic manoeuvre in support of the Kenyan military campaign continued to play out through coordinated efforts at the Regional and International Levels throughout the OLN campaign. The Horn of Africa Directorate within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was tasked with this important mission. Its major task was to target various international forums where issues around peace and security in the Greater Horn were discussed. These included for instance; the International Conference on Somalia held in London in February 2012, the International Conference Piracy that was held in February 2012 in Nairobi and the meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the countries in AMISOM held in Nairobi in January 2012 among others.

Further, Kenya's diplomatic manoeuvre enabled her to provide training and logistics support to the TFG forces. As early as 2009, long before OLN, Kenya was involved in training members of Somalia's civilian police force as well as military personnel. It was a move that was meant to give the TFG the necessary technical and logistical support in order to enable the TFG (which Kenya had helped establish under IGAD) ward-off the growing threat from the Al Shabaab. Kenya's diplomatic efforts also bore fruit when the United States in June 2012 managed to name, shame and blacklist at least three Somalia citizens who were known to work closely with the Somali and/or Fundamentalist Diaspora in funding Al Shabaab among other terror-linked groups. In early 2012, Kenya's diplomatic manoeuvre enabled her to take the position of Chair at the IGAD of the Peace and Security Council, a strategic position in enhancing the OLN agenda regionally and internationally.

The Switch from Unilateral to Multilateral Action: Diplomatic Manoeuvre and Kenya's Re-hat into AMISOM

On 2 June 2012 the Government of Kenya and the Commission of the African Union signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to govern Kenya's contribution of troops and resources to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The signing of the MoU marked the official re-hat of the KDF to AMISOM following the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) in February 2012 on the increase of AMISOM's force strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel including the 4,664 Kenya Defence Force (KDF), with enhanced mandate from Peace keeping to Peace enforcement.

The adoption of the UNSC Resolution 2036 (2012) followed a meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and members of the UN Security Council on 11th January, 2012 during which the AU presented the Strategic Concept for future operations of AMISOM in Somalia.

The US commended the decision by Kenya and Ethiopia to join the African Union Force fighting Al Shabaab militants in Somalia. US Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs, Johnnie Carson, argued that Kenya and Ethiopia should strengthen the AMISOM and use it to fight the militants in Somalia. Carson appreciated the difficulties Kenya was facing in dealing with the insecurity emanating from Somalia and urged the country to work with AMISOM in advancing the stability of Somalia instead of going it alone.

While the European Union (EU) backed Kenya's war against the Al Shabaab, the organization however argued that military action alone would not create lasting security in Somalia and underlined need for coordination of military and security operations in Somalia with the TFG, IGAD, AU and the UN to ensure that military action against the Al Shabaab is consolidated to ensure sustainable peace.

Before concluding this paper, it is imperative to pose critical questions in regards to the role of diplomatic manoeuvre in Kenya's military campaign in Somalia. The main question being to what extent the engagements helped secure Kenya's long and short-term strategic objectives in Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa region. True enough, diplomatic expediency has worked quite positively for Kenya. However, it is still early in the day to get a comprehensive picture of all the aspects associated with the planning, execution and the actual impact of the military campaign in Somalia. Irrespective of this fact, from the foregoing discussions, the general take is that diplomacy did and still continues to play an important role in securing both regional and international support for the Kenyan engagement in Somalia. The search for lasting peace in Somalia continues and despite the enhancement of AMISOM, the capture of the port town of Kismayu, the war against the Al Shabaab and the stabilization of Somalia remains a challenge. Indeed, it has been demonstrated by experiences from campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere that the search for lasting peace is a long term and arduous task. Military campaigns only part, albeit important, of the required wider-ranging interventions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Through concerted and well implemented diplomatic efforts prior to, during and after the short-lived "Operation Linda Nchi" inside Somalia; Kenya was able to secure the necessary moral, political and financial support from various nations and organizations, including the Commonwealth, AU, EU, Indian Ocean Rim Association, COMESA, South Africa, Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, USA, UK, France, Nigeria, Qatar, Oman, Israel, and South Sudan. Nonetheless while war is the ultimate argument of the state, diplomacy becomes the oil that lubricates the actual conduct of hostilities and to map-out the way for a conclusive and sustainable victory. True enough; an inconclusive peace in Somalia is as bad as an inconclusive war and it is fraught with greater uncertainty not only for Somalia but also for Kenya and the international community at large. Diplomacy therefore does not cease, even after war. Instead, it becomes focused on the shaping of tomorrow's peace with today's enemy in mind. As role of

diplomatic manoeuvre to the very conclusion of the entire exercise cannot be over emphasized. In conclusion, the prediction is that the ongoing military approach to the Somalia question will subsequently require to be succeeded by concerted multilateral diplomatic processes once the Al Shabaab and other major destabilizing elements are eliminated. This way, peace will be institutionalized and sustained. While sustaining the war and achieving victory was the ultimate strategic goal for OLN and now AMISOM, future medium-to-long-term vulnerabilities and retaliatory attacks from the Al-Shabaab and related elements should be expected in the Eastern African region. Thus diplomatic manoeuvre will continue to play an important role in the search for sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

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