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**A Critical Assessment of the European Union’s Impact on the African Union Peace Process: A case of AMISOM.**

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**Abstract**

*The African Union is the world’s largest and most diverse regional blocs in terms of the membership to the institution, geographical size features and diverse income levels. It is also characterized by some of the poorest and conflict prone countries in the world. On the other hand, the European Union is the cornerstone of regional integration process in the world today and the most progressed regional community in the world thereby serving as a model. EU has been a good partner in offering peace and security support to the African Union integration process. One of the key objectives of African Union integration process is to attain peace and security among the member states and within the borders of individual states. In an EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon held in 2007, The EU and Africa agreed that through establishment of and Africa Peace Facility (APF), the EU would backstop Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), by making a substantial financial contribution towards the reinforcement of African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in various AU member states that were engaged in conflict, in cooperation with the relevant African regional organisations. Consequently, the EU has been very instrumental in helping the African Union operationalize APSA. One area where this is visible is Somalia where payment of AMISOM Soldiers allowance has become the EU’s single largest development project in Africa. This paper gives an analysis of the support EU has given towards the management of the conflict resolution in the horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. It discusses how the support has transformed the conflict situation in Somalia.*

## **1. Background and the Literature Review**

Article 3 section (f) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union identifies promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent as one of the defining objectives of the Union. Further, the Union prioritizes sustainable development socio-economic growth of the continent among others, as avenue within which integration of the continent can be achieved.

The European Union and the African Union held a joint Summit in Cairo in 2000 (Cairo Summit, 2000). The summit identified peace and security, as a key strategy area that required serious collaboration between the two institutions. Gawaya, (2017) notes that it was in this summit in Cairo that a clear link between peace and development was made and collaboration between these areas prioritised as a strategy of achieving development. The strategy identified regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, and state failures as the main threats to peace in the African continent. To manage, contain and prevent conflict, a multidimensional method was proposed. This method would include a wide range of human security enhancement which include civilian and military instruments.

The two institutions have devised a three-pronged approach to achieve the peace and security agenda. One approach is ensuring the immediate short-term funding to prevent and address crises as they occur via the Early Response Mechanism. Secondly, investing in medium to long-term support for African Peace Support Operations and lastly, longer-term support for institutional capacity building in peace and security.

The Peace Support Operations (PSOs) are aimed at providing public security through a range of military and civilian tasks, including peacekeeping, maintenance of public order, policing, infrastructure reconstruction, political dialogue, and national reconciliation. The APF has provided support to 14 African-led PSOs in 18 countries Since 2004, Some of the African-led Peace Support Operations supported by the EU include:- African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ECOWAS Mission to Guinea Bissau (ECOMIB), The Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram; The Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA); IGAD-led Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) in South Sudan. African Union deployment of Human

Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi (Burundi HROs/MEs) ECOWAS Mission in the Gambia (ECOMIG) and the G5 Sahel Joint Force

As a mechanism of promoting peace in the continent, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been established. Invoking the provision of the treaty which allows AU to intervene in cases of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, APSA has gained legitimacy of being the body that is mandated to promote and maintain peace. The primary objective APSA is to promote peace, security and stability in African continent and the Regional Economic Communities Mpyisi, 2012). APSA mandate relates to prevention of conflicts, management of conflicts when they occur, resolution of conflicts and recovery of communities destroyed ravaged by conflicts post-war. APSA is governed by the Peace and Security Council protocol. The protocol came into force in December 2003, following its adoption in earlier in 2002 in Durban South Africa. APSA, has adopted the following institutions to support in its implementation of its mandate.

**Peace and Security Council (PSC):** According Article 2, (Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union), the PSC is responsible for the decision-making processes on behalf of APSA. The decisions which the organ has a mandate over revolve around prevention and management of conflict when they occur. PSC approves all peace-related activities and legitimises peace operations. The PSC is also responsible for ensuring that the political and the security wing of the African Union are in harmony.

**Panel of the Wise:** PoW acts as an advisory platform which warns and advices when there is likelihood of conflict arising. The panel comprises of five highly renowned individuals who are appointed by the chairperson of the African Union Commission. The appointment is done in consultation with the member states where the personalities come from.

**Continental Early Warning System:** This is a system that is designed to collect conflict related data across the continent, analyse it guided by agreed upon early warning indicators. The purpose of this system is to enhance preparedness and timely response to conflict situations.

**African Standby Force (ASF):** Once the early warning data is analysed, should there be legitimate threat to peace and security in a certain area, a multidisciplinary contingent is sent to

restore peace and order. The contingent is made up of military and civilian personnel. For, the missions to be conducted, they must be approved by the Assembly of the African Union.

**Military Staff Committee:** This is a committee which is made up of chiefs of defence forces of the member states that serve in the Peace and Security Council. They have a responsibility of advising the PSC on military equipment and military personnel matters.

**Peace Fund:** This is an account which draws funds from the African Union budget, non-state actors support including the civil society and the private sector as well as voluntary contributions from individuals. In essence the Peace fund is the financial arm of the PSC.

APSA operates under the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES), a first of its kind initiative where the EU engages the AU directly unlike before where the Africa was lumped together with other countries in the Asian Continent. Of all the preceding frameworks of cooperation between the EU and Africa, it was JAES that gave the serious consideration to conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Previous framework concentrated on trade agreement and donor aid to foster development through the Millennium Development Goals. JAES highlighted the link between security, peace, and development.

The implementation of the APSA has been facing a myriad of challenges. Top on the list being weak institutions which are incapable of dealing sufficiently with conflicts which crop up from various African countries. Incapacity of APSA is further compounded by the fact that the organisation is grappling with addressing existing conflicts and building lasting peace concurrently. Due to these inadequacies, APSA partnered has partnered with the EU through the framework of African Peace Facility (APF). APF is the protocol which guides implementation of EU-AU cooperation on peace and security. Since creation, in 2004, the APF has supported peace and security in Africa with more than 60% of APSA overall budget. These funds are meant to “Silence the guns before 2020” by: - (i) Support African-led peace support operations, such as the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram, the African Union Mission to Somalia, and the G5 Sahel Joint Force (DSA). (ii) Establishment of Early Warning Mechanism. (iii) Mediation activities and fact-finding missions. The purpose of the EU involvement is also to liberate the EU from the pressure of intervening in African conflicts.

EU acknowledges the need to let African Union own and drive the process of peace keeping in the continent thereby coming in, in the aspects of financial support. Through African Peace Facility, EU has supported various peace missions in different African States. Under 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF), EU allocated a start-up budget of €250M for institutional capacity building programmes of the APSA. Since then, EU has availed significant amount of funds to support the peace support operations such as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS); African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) among others. The table below shows some of the main programmes funded by the EU since the formation of the African Peace Facility (APF).

Table 1: Programmes funded by the EU since the formation of the APF.

PROGRAMME	AMOUNT IN EUROS	DURATION	STRATEGIC PRIORITY AREAS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	€ 1 638 000 000	03/2007 – Ongoing	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism in South Sudan (CTSAMM)	€ 19 169 601	1/09/2014 - 31/10/2018	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) – ECOMIB I & II	€ 15 196 792	16/07/2015 – 31/12/2017	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
EU Support to G5 Sahel Joint Force	€ 100 000 000	08/2017 – Ongoing	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram	€ 50 000 000	1/07/2016 – 31/12/2018	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance
Support to the African Union Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission in Burundi	€ 7 847 365	1/11/2016 – 31/03/2018	Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance

Source: (The Africa-EU partnership, 2018)

The finances are used to procure information and communications equipment, soldier’s uniform, health facilities and equipment, transport logistics and soldiers per diems. The only cost the EU does not take up is procurement of military arms. EU support to the African Union is therefore

two-pronged, institutional capacity and direct military operations in the field. Paying AMISOM's monthly allowances has become the EU's single largest development project in Africa. Deneckere (2019) highlights the APF, funded under the European Development Fund (and hence not part of the EU budget), has channeled a total of EUR 2.7 billion between 2004 and 2017 to financially support the African Union (AU) peace and security operations.

This paper focuses on the financial support disbursed to the African Union Mission to Somalia, as a case study.

### **1.1 African Union Mission in Somalia**

AMISOM was established by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19<sup>th</sup> January 2007, AMISOM (2017). Its Mandate is to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FDS), to stabilize the nation. The Republic of Somalia before and after independence has been plagued by conflicts emanating from power struggles, identity politics, terrorism, and the political economy of organized violence. AMISOM is funded by Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and several partners notably the EU, US, and UK as well as assistance from a private firm, such as Bancroft Global Development. Williams, (2017) notes that while bilateral donors provided most training, equipment, and mentoring support for the TCCs, the EU provides the allowances for AMISOM's uniformed personnel as well as some other forms of support. After 2009, the UN also joined the donor pool by providing logistical support to the mission through its Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Williams (2017) concludes that calculating the overall cost of AMISOM's activities would therefore involve the sum of bilateral support to the TCCs, AMISOM's annual budget, additional donor support (through the trust funds) as well as UNSOA's budget. Between 2009 and 2016, the annual cost of running AMISOM rose from approximately \$350 million to \$900 million.

EU funds are used to cover allowances for AMISOM troops, salaries and allowances for the police component of the mission, international and local civilian staff salaries, operational costs for the mission's offices in Nairobi/Mogadishu and the AMISOM General Dhagabadan Training Camp in Mogadishu and costs for AMISOM quick impact projects (QIPs).

The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of EU financial support to AMISOM towards the peace keeping military intervention in Somalia.

### **Methodology**

The research paper has adopted evaluation research design. This design is most the most appropriate in accounting for resources given to the AU, as well as describing their impact and assessing the effectiveness of the resources in conflict prevention, resolution, and management. The method of data collection employed is desk review of secondary materials available.

AMISOM has been used a case study of the EU involvement in peace and security mandate of the African Union Kothari, (2004) finds case study method ‘as a very popular form of qualitative analysis and involves a careful and complete observation of a social unit, be that unit a person, a family, an institution, a cultural group or even the entire community.

### **Impact of the EU support towards conflict prevention, resolution, and management in Somalia**

The EU has been a faithful partner of the APSA since its formation by providing allowances and supporting trainings. In addition to that the EU makes its contribution regularly to UN peacekeeping initiatives used to fund UNSOA/UNSOS. The member countries of the EU notably France and Italy also provide additional and separate funds to APSA. It is therefore fair to conclude that the EU has met its end of the bargain in supporting peace keeping in the African Union.

As a result of this support, AMISOM has significantly reduced the areas under Al-Shabaab control. As a result of urban warfare between the AMISOM soldiers and the Al-Shabaab militia, AMISOM has driven majority of Al-Shabaab fighters out of Mogadishu and its environs. From 2012, following the addition of more troops from Kenya and Djibouti, the mission also pushed most Al-Shabaab forces out of several urban settlements in south-central Somalia, including Kismayo and Baidoa. Williams (2019) notes that this has provided respite from the harsh rules of militia’s governance and encouraged leadership by the local communities. Secondly, in 2012 and

2016–2017, AMISOM played a major role in ensuring that two elections were carried out which established new federal governments in 2012 and 2017, respectively.

Thirdly, in its period of operations, through support to transport and conference facilities, AMISOM has played a pivotal role in the establishment of south-central Somalia's new Regional Administrations namely, Jubaland (2013), South West (2014), Galmudug (2015), and Hirshabelle (2016). Without those new regions, it would be impossible for Somalia to build a federal system of government. Lastly, during the AMISOM's period of operation, AMISON has provided security to international diplomatic and humanitarian communities to operate out of Mogadishu and across south-central Somalia.

To date, the EU is also the biggest donor to Somalia, not only in the peace and security front but also in livelihoods support through its EU long-term development strategy in Horn of Africa. Using the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific, (ACP) financial instrument, the EU has channeled billions of euros into governance, education, economic growth, and support to food security, health, environment, water and sanitation. The money allocated to the above-mentioned sectors have been replenished every five years through the platform of the EDF. Although this has gone a long way in helping protect the livelihoods and establishing lasting institutional framework in the horn of Africa, upscaling investments in the institutions of public goods such as roads and electricity should be considered. Such investments have been proven to boost development quickly than the livelihood support to sectors. This has been attributed to the fact that such investments go directly to the masses unlike their livelihood sector support that is characterized by high administrative budgets.

The European Recovery Program, also known as the Marshal plan, serves as an ideal example which assisted the Western European nations recover from the devastation of the World War II. The program established in 1948 and injected more than USD 15 billion which was at the time a huge sum to finance the reconstruction efforts in Europe and Japan. The four-year program assisted in reconstruction of cities, industries, and infrastructure heavily damaged during the war.

Similarly, the EU supported construction of the 118-kilometer-long section of the international road between Merrill and Marsabit in Kenya. The small section has opened the Northern Kenya



towns to tourism and business on top of linking them up with the neighboring Ethiopia. Such program should be prioritized to the dominant sectorial support.

### **Challenges associated with EU support towards conflict prevention, resolution and management in Somalia.**

One of the challenges that EU support has faced is the controversies that AMISOM has been marred with emanating from the to the reduction of the soldiers per diems. The EU reduced the allowances by 20%, from \$1,028 to \$822 per soldier, per month (Williams, 2017). The new rates were revised according to standard UN reimbursement rate. Secondly, the delaying Burundians soldiers per diems occasioned by EU Council decision to impose sanctions on Burundi resulted to Burundi threatening to withdraw its troops.

The longevity of the mission is another point of concern. For instance, the January of 2020 marked 13 years of AMISOM's existence. Military operations are not meant to stay that long in an area. On the contrary, their objective of military operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited period, until civil authorities can do so without being assisted by the military. Prolonged stay in Somalia is risky considering that there are other pressing issues that are emerging in other areas in the continent which could result to a potential shift in focus. Besides, in disaster management, when disasters prolong for a long time, donor community tends to suffer from compassion fatigue leading to their pooling out even if the disaster, for this case conflict has not yet been resolved.

On the JAES, many are of the view that if indeed Joint Strategy is truly an equal partnership, there should be serious discussions about human rights violations in Europe especially against people of African and Arab descent. Many scholars feel that the emphasis by the EU on values and shared norms of good governance, human rights, and respect to the rule of law is plagued by double standards and insincerity. This is not to mean that human rights atrocities in Africa should be condoned or any case, less relevant. The double standards employed by Europe is consequently less likely to yield any result in helping the cause of democratization and good governance within the AU member states.

EU has greatly been criticized for being at the forefront of condemning violations of governmental against human rights but remaining rather silent when German Chancellor Angela Merkel visited China in 2019 to sign contracts worth billions regardless of Chinese human rights record. This because the economic might of China is much bigger than of the whole of Africa combined. It therefore goes to depict that, when countries are of strategic geopolitical or economic importance, their governance credentials and human rights records are not important. Instead, small and poor countries are bullied into highhanded EU standards.

### **Involvement of the EU in other counties directly out of APF framework**

There are concerns that even with the elaborate APF facility, the EU I still engaging African nations directly on peace and security matters. For instance, Mpyisi (2009) elaborates that EU forces in Chad (EUFOR) on October 2007, the Council of the European Union allowed the EU to conduct its largest military operation in Africa. This was in the Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The mandate of this mission was to protect civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons, protect UN personnel and equipment, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. The mission was conceived as a startup operation, which was to be replaced by a UN mission.

Mangala (2013) indicates that before the mission in Chad and CAR the EU had previously been involved in Operation Artemis, its first ever first military operation out of the EU region. Artemis was considered successful in that it managed to protect civilians from imminent danger of physical violence, restored peace all the way to the town and the airport, establishing a weapons-free zone inside the town and increased humanitarian conditions.

## **2. Conclusion**

The EU support has significantly impacted the pursuit for peace in the Horn of Africa region. In Somalia specifically, the EU has led to capturing of Kismayu, pacifying Mogadishu. Two democratic elections have been carried out, hopefully marking the end of violent government regimes transition. Supporting African responses to violent conflicts across the continent is of major importance to the European Union (EU). However, this is not only out of goodwill. The abundance of natural resources particularly in energy security has been sighted as one of the

reason EU is very interested with having a peaceful Africa. Due to the unpredictability of the Middle East and easing EUs dependency on Russia compounded by emerging economies such as China and India, Africa 's stability is important towards the EU advancing its economic interests.

On the contrary, the support has made the peace support operations be heavily reliant on donor aid. The total dependence of APSA to financial aid from the EU is risky. Should EU funding be withdrawn, then APSA would collapse. Secondly, EU has instituted a model that can only be instituted through the EU support. This is an expensive model which requires high-level technological investment to be sustained. The paper has established that the EU also supports parallel institutions to deal with democracy and peace in the horn of Africa such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Security is such a delicate matter that should be dealt with in a methodical and planned manner. The multiplicity of different agencies involvement complicates the matter rather than solve. This research found out that some members of the EU do pursue separate peace policies of their own outside the EU-APSA. As a result, the EU military activities in some parts of Africa for example the EU forces in Chad (EUFOR) have been regarded as counter productive. As a result, the competing agendas of EU might to an extent undermine the JAES framework in the areas of peace and security.

### **Recommendations**

African Union has expressed the desire to take up ownership of the Unions by increasing member's contribution towards implementation of programmes. Financing the Union decree made in Kigali in 2016 where the AU Member States are expected to implement a 0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the AU and reducing dependency on partner funds should be enforced. As it is now the JAES slogan 'African problem, African solutions' seems to have been replaced by African Problems, European Solutions.

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